Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972

State of Utah v. Robert Norman Macri : Brief of Respondent

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Vernon B. Romney and David S, Young; Attorney for
Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Macri, No. 12799 (1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5610

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In The

of the State·@f{

STATE OF UTAH,

. :.,;

P'lafttiff '<
·-1.

TL

ROBER'r· NORMAN X

....

D8fi6'1_•
..

BRIEF OF"-

ROBERT NORMAN
1218 Fourth Avenue

Salt Lake City, Utah 8'108
Appellant, pro ae
1.0RRAIN• PR•H

t197 llOUTN llAlll .,.• ...,

·,

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEl\IENT OF NATURE OF CASE______

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ----------------

1

STATEl\IENT OF }""'ACTS . ------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT:

I

POINT I. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
SECTION 55-10-80 (1953), AS
DOES NOT REQUIRE A SHOWING OF INTENT. ---------·-·----------·-----------------

3

POINT IL UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
SECTION 55-10-80 (1953), AS AMENDED, IS NOT SO VAGUE OR INDEFINATE AS TO VIOLATE THE
FOURTEENTH
------------

7

POINT III. APPELLANT WAS NOT
PREJUDICED BY THE ALLEGED
UNSWORN A N D PREJUDICIAL
COMMENTS OF OFFICER JOE GEE.__

15

POINT IV. THERE IS NO MATERIAL
INCONSISTENCY IN THE TESTIMONY OF OFFICER MALMBORG
AND ANY INFERENCE BY THE APPELLANT TO THE EFFECT THAT
IT IS IMPROPER TO REFRESH A

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
Page
WITNESS'S MEI\;IORY IS CONTRARY
TO THE EXISTING RULES OF LAW.

18

CONCLUSION ··-------·-----------·-------------·--------------------- 20
CASES CITED
Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d 669 (1963 Alaska) ____

6

Bct.z v. Goff, 5 Ariz ..App. 404, 427 P.2d 538
( 1967) ----------·---.. --.·--.----·.____ ,_ __ -· ·---------·-·--... ·-----·-- 18
Brockmuellcr v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P .2d 992
( 1959) ------· ---··---------- ------- .... ·---------"" ------------------· --

10

Cornrnonv..:ealth v. Randall. 183 Pa. Super. 603, 133
A.2d 276 ( 1967) cert. den. 355 U.S. 954 ________ 12
Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (1963
\\Tyo.) ---------- ___ .. ------------ ___ ·---·------------------------- ·-----

18

Jones v. Ilagan, 851P.2d153 (1960 Wash.) ________

17

People v. Calkins, 48 Cal. App. 2d 33, 119 P.2d
142 ( 1941) -- ------------ ---·--··--·---···-·-··-·
------··--···---- 11
People v. Gory, 28 Cal. 2d 450, 170 P.2d 433
( 1946) --· -------------···---··---·-···---··-··----------·------·-------

4

People v. Owens, 13 :Mich. App. 469, 164 N.W.2d
712 ( 1968) .------··-----·--··------·-··-----····-·---·--·---·-·-·--··- 11
People v. Reznick, 75 Cal. App. 2d 832, 171 P.2d
952 ( 194()) -------···-·----··--··---·------------------·-----------·--

6

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued

Page

People v. Sweeney, 66 Cal. App. 2d 855, 153 P.2d
371 ( 1944) -······-·----------------·--····-··----·-----------······-·· 5
State v. Carter, 1 Ariz. App. 57, 399 P.2d 191
( 1965) ------· --- .·---·-··-------- ·-..... -------------------------------- 19
State v. Merrifield, 180 Kan. 267, 303 P.2d 155
5
( 1956) ----·-----------------·----------·------····---------------------State v. Tritt, 23 U.2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970) __ 7, 9
State v. 1Finger, 41 Wash. 2d 229, 248 P.2d 555
( 1952) -------------· --------- ------- ... -···----------------------------5
Veal v. Newlin, 367 P.2d 155 (1961 Alaska) ________ 20
V. E. McDonald v. Commorm::ealth, 331 S.W.2d
716 ( 1960 Ky.) ----------------------------·-··------------------- 13

STATU'l'ES CITED
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 55-10-63 (1953) as amended

8

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 55-10-77 (Supp 1971) -------- 8, 9
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 55-10-80 (1953),
as amended ---·------------------·-------·-----1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-1-20 (1953), as amended__

4

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES
96 C.J.S. 1Vitnesses Sec. 357 ·------·-············---------------19

In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plalntiff-Respondent.
vs.

ROBERT NOHJ\iAN MACRI,

Case No.
12799

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant was convicted in the District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, Utah Code
Ann. § 55-10-80 ( 1953), as amended, before the
Honorable Paul C. Keller, Judge, sitting without a
jury. Appellant was sentenced to a term of three months
in the county jail and fined the sum of $200.00 with the
jail sentence to be suspended upon the condition that the
fine would be paid within 60 days.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks af firmance of the lower court
judgment and sentence.
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OF FACTS
Reverlv Smith, the minor's mother, testified that
she discovered her daughter missing on the 8th of July,
1970 (R. 4); that her daughter ·was gone without her
permission ( R. 4) ; and that at no time had she given
her daughter permission to stay at the appellant's residence (R. 5).
The minor daughter testified that she was 14 years
old (R. 21) and that she left home without telling her
mother how long she would be gone ( R. 21). The minor
stated that her mother gave her permission to leave for
a while to visit a friend but that she (the minor) did not
return home. (R. 22). ,.rhe minor further testified that
the night of July 8th she stayed in a public park; that
on the night of July 9th, 11th and 14th she stayed in a
van parked outside of the Alameda Street Church, which
was operated and occupied by the appellant; and that
on the nights of July 10th, 12th an<l 13th, she stayed
inside the church. ( R. 22) .
\Vhile at the church the minor saw the appellant in
the kitchen ( R. 24) and on various other occassions between July 8th and July I.5th (R. 24). Appellant never
asked her if she lived in Salt Lake City; if she was staying away from home without her parents permission;
never asked her how old she was or what she was doing;
and never asked her to leave ( R. 25) . During cross
examination the minor testified that remaining at the
church assisted her in staying away from home as it afforded her a place to stay. (R. 32). 'fhe minor also testified that while she was at the Alameda Street Church
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she was allowed to eat, cook and sleep there. (R. 26 et
seq., 31, 25).
Officer .T ohn :Malmborg testified that he talked
with the appellant on the date of the minor's arrest (R.
54) and that the appellant, at that time, was on the
porch at the entrance to the front door of the church.
(R. 54, 56). Officer l\1almborg inquired of the whereabouts of l\1r. Charles Artman. Appellant stated that
Mr. Artman was not present but that he (the appellant)
was co-tenant and offered his assistance. (R. 56). After
the appellant was informed by Officer Malmborg that
he was looking for the minor girls the appellant acknowledged the girls' presence and stated that they were in a
back room. ( R. 64) . In oral argument before the court,
appellant's co-defendant made inferences to the effect
that the appellant participated in and was a part of the
operation of the Alameda Street Church. (R. 89 lines
10-18 et seq. and R. 91lines7-15).
Throughout the trial the appellant was represented
by his own counsel, :Mr. Richard L. Young. At the conclusion of the state's case l\1r. Young and the appellant
did not desire to put on any evidence or call any witnesses in appellant's behalf. (R. 93).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAII CODE ANNOTATED SECTION
55-10-80 (1953), AS AJVIEND.ED, DOES NOT REQUIRE A SHOWING OF INTENT.
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Even though Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-20
( 1953) , as amended, requires that in every crime or
public offense there must be a "union or joint operation
of act and intent, or criminal negligence," it is clearly
within the power of the legislature to make certain acts
criminal without requiring intent. Such statutes are generally enacted in the area of laws which are intended to
protect the public morals, health, peace and safety.
In People v. Gory, 28 Cal. 2d 450, 170 P.2d 433
( 1946) the court stated:
"So far as pertinent to defendant's argument, section 20 of the Penal Code provides
that 'In every crime or public offense there
must exist a union, or joint operation of act
and intent***.' But this does not mean that a
positive, willful intent to violate the law is an
essential ingredient of every offense. Sometimes an act is expressly prohibited by statute,
in which case the intentional doing of the act,
regardless of good motive or ignorance of its
criminal character constitutes the offense denounced by law. Instances illustrating this
principle may be found in statutes enacted for
the protection of public morals, public health,
and the public peace and safety. [Citations
omitted.] If a specific intent is not made an
ingredient of the statutory offense it is not
necessary to prove such specific intent in order
to justify conviction." Id. at 435.
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Appellant's c11rsory allegation that intent is required for a conviction under U .C.A. ( 1953) 55-10-80
( 1953), as amended, is erroneous. "It is only where,
from the language or effects of the penal law, a purpose to require the existence of such an intent can be
discovered that such an intent need be shown." People
v. Sweeney, 66 Cal. App. 2d 855, 153 P.2d 371 at 372
(1944).
U.C.A. § .55-10-80 does not require a showing of intent. "\\rhen the legislature passed the statute, its purpose was not only to punish the wrongdoer, but also to
protect youth from practices and persons who might
impede their normal growth and development as young
adults.
" ... [Ilt must be noted that the statute
under which defendant was charged does not
require that the act be intentional or willful. It
is within the power of the legislature to declare
an act criminal, irrespective of the intent of the
doer of the act. "Thether intent is an essential
element of a statutory crime depends upon the
intent of the legislature." State v. Winger 41
v\T ash. 2d 229, 248 p .2d 555 at 557 ( 1952).
In State v. "JJf crrifield, 180 Kan. 267, 303 P.2d 155
(1956), the Supreme Court of Kansas stated:
"The legislature may for bid the doing of
an act and make its commission criminal without regard to the intent or knuwledge of the
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doer, and where the legislative intention appears, it is incumbent upon the courts to give
it effect, although the intent of the doer may
have been innocent. 'l'he doing of an inhibited
act constitutes the crime, and the moral turpitude or purity of motive by which it is prompted, and the knowledge or ignorance of its
criminal character, are immaterial circumstances
on the question of guilt." Id. at 157.
In Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1963)
the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed a conviction for
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The court rejected the defendant's contention that since the indictment charged a willful commission of the act, knowledge that the prosecutrix was under 18 was an essential
element of the crime charged. The court noted that the
word "willful" did not appear in the statute, and emphasized that the statute, which did not make specific intent
an ingredient of the offense, eliminated the necessity
for awareness of the specific wrongdoing.
When specific intent is not an ingredient of a statutory offense, it is not necessary to prove such intent to
justify a conviction. (See People v. Reznick, 75 Cal.
App. 2d 832, 171P.2d952 (1946).) Appellant's contention that a requirement of specific intent be read into
the statute is without merit and should be rejected by
this court.

7
POINT II
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION
55-10-80 (1953), AS AMENDED, IS NOT SO
VAGUE OR INDEFINITE AS TO VIOLATE
TIIE FOURTEENTH Al\1ENDMENT.
The appellant contends by broad, conclusory statements, unsupported by any authority, that Utah Code
Annotated Sec. 55-10-80 is so vague as to violate Fourteenth ..c\mendment standards of due process. Appellant
contends that this allegation is supported by this court's
decision in State v. Tritt, 23 U.2d 365, 463 P.2d 806
(1970) and by the fact that the 1971 Utah State Legislature amended Section 55-10-77 Utah Code Ann. so as
to remove runaways from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Appellant's contentions are non-sequitur. Obviously,
appellant is not charged with being a runaway. The
charge, as contained in the complaint was:
"That Robert Norman Macri, in violation
of .55-10-80, U.C.A., as amended, aided and encouraged Robyn Ann Smith to become or remain a runaway by permitting and encouraging her to sleep and/ or reside in a house which
he is renting and occupying.
The said acts on the part of the defendant
having caused or did manifestly tend to cause
the said child to become or remain delinquent."
(R. 196).

8

The allegation contained m the complaint is set
forth in specific terms and fully advised the appellant
of what conduct he was charged with so as to adequately
allow the appellant to prepare his defense thereof. Appellant's reference to Utah Code Ann. 55-10-77 is of
little, if any, merit.
Utah Code Ann. Section 55-10-63 (1953) as amended, states that in order to effectuate the purposes of the
Juvenile Court statutes, the statutes are to be liberally
construed. The 1971 amendment of Utah Code Ann .
.55-10-77, to which the appellant refers, substituted the
word "who" for "whose," at the beginning of the statute and inserted the phrase "is beyond the control of
his parent, guardian, or other lawful custodian to the
point that his" before the phrase "behavior or condition"
in subsection (2) (b) and deleted the phrase "or who has
run away from his home or who is otherwise beyond the
control of his parents, custodian, or school authorities"
at the end of subsection ( 2) ( c).
As originally constituted, the statute was redundant
in stating "or who has run away from his home or who is
otherwise beyond the control of his parent." (Emphasis
supplied.) Clearly, according to the original wording
of the statute, a runaway was but one example of a juvenile who was "beyond the control of his parent." The
1971 amendment eliminated this repetitious wording and
now states:
" ( 2) ( b) who is beyond the control of his parent,
guardian, or other lawful custodian .... "
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The language of Section 55-10-77 ( 2) ( b) does not
indicate that runaways are now beyond the jurisdiction
of the juvenile courts. On the contrary, it is clear that
the legislative intent is to include runaways as being one
type of a juvenile "who is beyond the control of his parent," and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.
Reiterating the obvious, appellant was charged
with aiding Robyn Ann Smith to remain a runaway by
permitting and encouraging her to sleep and/ or reside
in a house which he was renting and occupying. Utah
Code Ann. 55-10-80 (1) provides that the Juvenile
Court shall have jurisdiction over:
"Any person eighteen years of age or over
who induces, aids, or encourages a child to violate any federal, state, or local law or municipal
ordinance, or who tends to cause children to
become or remain delinquent, or who aids, contributes to, or becomes responsible for the
neglect or delinquency of any child:"
The recent case of State v. Tritt, supra, contains
important language for this court to consider in the case
at bar. In Tritt, this court stated that even though the
appellant did not specifically raise the question of the
constitutionality of lJtah Code Ann. 55-10-80(1), if he
had raised the issue this court could not agree that the
statute was invalid for being vague.
"However, we further observe that even if
those obstacles did not exist, and we could prop-
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erly consider the merits of the question, we
could not agree that the statute is invalid. The
foundational rules here are that all presumptions favor validity of the statute; and that it
will not be declared unconstitutional unless
found to be so beyond a reasonable doubt. The
terms 'delinquency' and 'contributing to the delinquencv' as applied to minors has for rnany
decades had such widespread usage as to give
clenr and
meaning that it denotes actions that tt•ill aid, encourage or involve
children in conduct which is contrary to law, or
•o.:hich is so contrary to the generally accepted
standards of decency and rnorality that its resnlt will be substantially harmf111 to the mental,
moral or physical well-being of the child. This
connotation of those terms is sufficiently well
known that persons of ordinary intelligence
and judgment who desire to do so would have
no difficult?/ in
their conduct by the
statute.-"' Id. at 369. (Emphasis supplied.)
Numerous other courts are in accord with the language of this court as set forth in Tritt. and have upheld
statutes worded similarly to that of Utah Code Ann.
55-10-80 as being constitutional. In Brockmueller v.
State, 86
82, 340 P.2d 992 (1950) the court stated:
"The Arizona statutes prohibit only the
causing or encouraging of acts which have the
effect of injuring the morals, health or welfare
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of a child. Such statutes have a long history of
commonlaw interpretation which renders sufficiently clear and meaningful language which
might otherwise be vague and uncertain." Id.
at 994.
"Even in criminal statutes, the language
adopted need not afford an interpretation approaching mathematical certainty.... We hold
that the Arizona statutes are sufficiently certain and definite to apprise men of ordinary intelligence of the conduct which the statute prohibits." Id.
In People v. Owens, 13 :Mich. App. 469, 164 N.W.
2d 712 ( 1968), the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld
as constitutional a statute very similar to the wording
of the Utah Statute. The court held that the statute
under which the defendant was convicted was not so
vague or indefinite that the defendant was denied his
constitutional right to be informed of the standard of
conduct required by him and to be appraised of the
charges against him, and that the defendant who abetted
a girl's departure from her home by promises of assistance and by providing a place for her to stay, served,
contributed, and directed the girl towards delinquency.
Similarly, in People v. Callcins, 48 Cal. App.2d 33,
119 P.2d 142 ( 1941), the defendant was charged with
contributing to the delinquency of a minor by assisting
a young girl to remain away from home for a period
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of several months. In affirmance of the defendant's
conviction the court stated:
"The main purpose of the Juvenile Court
law is to prevent the delinquency of children.
By this law acts or omissions which tend to
cause minors to become delinquent are made
criminal. It is the purpose of the statute to safeguard children from those influences which
would tend to cause them to become delinquent.
It is not necessary for the prosecutor to establish that defendant's acts or omissions resulted
in the minor's actual entry upon the idle or immoral course of conduct. The prosecutor establishes his case when he proves acts or omissions
on the part of the defendant which tend to
cause or encourage the minor to lead an idle,
dissolute, lewd or immoral life." Id. at 144.
In Commonwealth v. Randall, 183 Pa. Super. 603,
cert. den. 355 U.S. 954, 133 A.2d 276, ( 1957), the defendants were found guilty of furnishing liquor to
minors. The court held that the statute which provided
that whoever, being of the age of 21 years and upwards,
by an act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any
child under the age of eighteen years is guilty of a misdemeanor, was not so vague and indefinite that it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
" ..... (T) he common sense of the community, as well as the sense of decency, pro-
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priety and the morality which most people
entertain is sufficient to apply the statute
to each particular case, and to individuate what
particular conduct is rendered criminal by it."
Id. at 280.
"It is obvious that the mandates of the
statute are salutary measures designed to protect children. 'The ways and means by which
the venal mind may corrupt and debauch the
youth of our land, both male and female, are
so multitudinous that to compel a complete
enumeration in any statute designed for protection of the young before giving it validity
would be to confess the inability of modern
society to cope with the problems of juvenile
delinquency. [Citations omitted]'." Id.

Similarly, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in V. E.
McDonald v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.2d 716 (1960),
held that the statute proscribing contributing to the delinquency of a minor could not be deemed unconstitutional on the theory that it did not define with reasonable
certainty the acts to be condemned, in view of the fact
that the purpose and intent of the state were plain and
evident from the general terms used therein.
"It is impossible to detail all of the acts
which could conceivably fall within the condemnation of the statute as delinquencies or contributing to delinquency; hence, it was neces-
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sary to use general terms. The purpose and
intent of the statute are plain and evident from
the language used. The basis on which appellant contends that the statute is unconstitutional is not meritorious." Id. at 717.
The purposes of the Utah statute on contributing
to the delinquency of a minor are clear. One is to protect
minors not delinquent from any influence or condition
that might encourage them toward delinquency and the
second is to punish those who commit any acts or omit
the performance of any act, the effect of which is to
ca-nse a child to remain a delinquent.
The prosecutor in the case at bar established his case
when he showed that the apep1lant participated in the
operation and occupancy of the Alameda Street Church
(R. 56, 89, 91, 24) ; knew of the presence of the minor
child in the church ( R. 64) and never asked her if she
lived in Salt Lake City; if she was staying away from
home without her parents permission; never asked her
how old she was or what she was doing; and never asked
her to leave. (R. 25).
The lTtah statute on contributing to the delinquency of a minor is not so vague as to deprive the appellant
his constitutional right of due process of law as guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. The conviction and sentence of the appellant should be affirmed.
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POINT III
APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED
BY THE ALLEGED UNSWORN AND PREJUDICIAL COM31ENTS OF OFFICER JOE
GEE.
Appellant's allegation to the effect that Officer
Joe Gee "intruded into court with unsworn and prejudicial comments" (see page 3 of Appellant's brief), is not
borne out in fact nor by the record. Respondent only
refers to appellant's allegation at this time because of
its possible prejudicial effect.
At no place does it appear in the record that Officer Joe Gee ever entered into court with any "unsworn
and prejudicial comments." At trial, the prosecutor
brought the court's attention to the fact that there was
an indication that appellant and his co-defendant had
violated a restraining order previously issued by the
court. (R. 109). Judge Keller effectively and summarily dealt with the matter stating that it should be dealt
with separately at a later time.
"Judge Keller: Let me clarify this without any further argument. l\Ir. Goodwill, Mr.
Artman, please. I don't know how Judge
Garff might have handled this and what his
proposed procedure was, but if I am assigned
to this case I'll agree with Mr. Young's contention that that is something that should be
handled separately from any of the particular
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trial on the merits of the Complaint herein and
further that if you wish to bring that before
the Court, there should be a citation issued
advising the defendants that they are being
cited with contempt of the Court's previous
order and setting the matter upon the calendar
to be heard upon the citation rather than bringing it up in this manner,
Goodwill." (R.
110 lines 13-24).
Judge Keller further stated:
"v\Thy don't you consult with Judge
Garff and see if he wants that heard by me or
wants to consider that separately because I
deem it to be an entirely separate matter from
this trial. Even though the order was made in
conjunction with this arrest, I feel that getting
into it at the same time before this other matter is entirely concluded with the same Judge
could possibly be prejudicial and I'd rather not
proceed that way." (R. 112 lines 4-10).
"So, why don't you consult with Judge
Garff before we do definitely put it down and
if I am to hear it, I want a specific citation
alleging the alleged violation of the order, getting the specifics and so the defendants can
have due notice as to what they are being, or
what contempt is being claimed, and set it up
entirely separate from this trial." ( R. 112 lines
13-18).
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Clearly no prejudice resulted to the appellant by
the comments of the prosecutor. There was not a jury
present to be influenced by the prosecutor's remarks.
The comments of Judge Keller clearly reveal that the
Judge gave no weight to the statements of the prosecutor and that he would not use such statements as a basis
for his decision in the case at bar. The Judge properly
informed the parties that if such allegations were to
be made and considered it would have to be done in an
entirely separate trial.
Neither the appellant nor his counsel specifically
moved the court for a mis-trial (R. 109) and the appellant's brief is totally void of any showing that he was
in any manner prejudiced by the prosecutor's statements. In .Jones v. Hogan 351 P.2d 153 (1960) the
Supreme Court of 'Vashington held:
"If misconduct occurs, the trial court must
be promptly asked to correct it. Counsel may
not remain silent, speculating upon a favorable
verdict, and then, when it is adverse, use the
claimed misconduct as a life preserver on a motion for new trial or on appeal." Id. at 156.
The alleged misconduct of Officer Joe Gee who,
contrary to the allegation of appellant, did not appear
in court, does not justify a new trial where, as in the
instant case, there is no showing that the appellant suffered any prejudice and, there is an affirmative showing that the Judge took proper corrective measures al-

18
leviating any possibility of prejudice. For the purpose
of this statement, the respondent does not admit that
any prejudice occurred only that if some prejudice did
occur it was corrected by the actions of the trial judge.
(See Ford llfotor Company v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886,
892 (1963 Wyo.); Betz v. Goff, 5 Ariz. App. 404, 427
P.2d 538 (1967) .)

THERE IS NO lVIATERIAL INCONSISTENCY IN THE
OF OFFICER
AND ANY INFERENCE BY
THE APPELLANT TO TIIE EFFECT THAT
IT IS
TO REFRESH A WITNESS'S l\1EMORY IS CONTRAR-Y TO THE
EXISTING RULES OF LAW.
Appellant's contention that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because of alleged inconsistencies in Officer l\falmborg's testimony cannot
be sustained. The main inconsistencies alluded to by the
appellant pertain to the exact words that the appellant
and Officer l\'Ialmborg exchanged when the Officer
was preparing to arrest the minor girls. ( R. 56, 62, 63,
64) . The trial court manifestly believed the testimony
of Officer Malmborg and whether or not the officer
used the same words while testifying to the encounter
with the appellant is irrelevant. The content of his testimony was consistent in all aspects.
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The appellant was at the Alameda Street Church
when Officer
arrived to make his arrest
(R. 54, 56); the appellant stated that he was the cotenant of the church and that he knew of the whereabouts of the girls (R. 56, 62, 63, 64). Consequently,
the decision of the trial court adverse to the appellant is
conclusive in this regard. At no time did the appellant
deny or allege that any of the statements made by Officer Malmborg were not true nor did he in any other manner exhibit any evidence or testimony to the contrary.
The law is well established that in certain situations, for the purpose of enabling him to testify, a witness may be permitted to refresh his memory or
stimulate his power of recollection by the use of written
matter. A witness who has the means of aiding his momory by a recourse to memoranda or papers may be required to look at such papers in order to enable him to
ascertain a fact with precision, to verify a date or to
give more exact testimony than he otherwise could as to
times, number, quantities and the like. (See 98 C.J .S.
Witnesses Sec. 357; State v. Carter, 1 Ariz. App. 57,
399 P.2d 191 (1965).)

The trial court and the prosecutor made it clear,
after discussion between the court and counsel for both
sides, that Officer Malmborg was to answer questions
asked of him if he could answer them (R. 54). If the
officer's answer was "I don't remember." the prosecutor would then ask him to look at his memoranda to
refresh his memory - at which time the memoranda
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would be made available for examination by the appellant and his counsel. Prior to the establishment of this
procedure Officer
had responded to only
four questions. (R. 51, 52). Thereafter no objection
was made to any questions asked the witness. In fact
the record clearly reveals that after the first four questions had been asked and answered it was not necessary
for the witness to again refer to his memoranda for the
purpose of refreshing his memory. The appellant suffered no prejudice by allowing the witness to respond
to four questions prior to the establishment of a procedure by which the witness could refresh his memory.
The conviction and sentence of the appellant should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The meager arguments contained in appellant's
brief clearly show that there was no error or reason that
the trial court's decision should be overturned.
"We believe that an appellant has a particular obligation to adequately prepare his
case so as to be of assistance to this court.
That was not done in this case. V\T e consider
this an appropriate occasion to remind counsel
that the presentation of cases without adequate
preparation discredits the bar and obstructs the
administration of justice." Veal v. Newlin, 367
P.2d 155 at 157 (1961 Alaska).
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The conduct of appellant constitutes contributing
to the delinquency of a minor in that acts or omissions
by the appellant aided the minor child to remain a runaway. The conviction and sentence of the lower court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General

Attorneys for Respondent

